






















A DUOPOLY EXPERIMENT ON COOPERATIVE 
AND NONCOOPERATIVE R&D 
 




























In this paper an experimental environment to test theoretical predic-
tions concerning R&D behavior of ﬁrms in duopoly with allowance
for R&D spillovers is created. The design and hypotheses of the
experiment are based on the well-known model of d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin in which R&D behavior of ﬁrms either competing or co-
operating in R&D, is calculated. No diﬀerence in behavior between
diﬀerent spillover levels is found. Further, I ﬁnd that — irrespective
of the technological spillover level — subjects do not always commit
to an R&D contract but if they commit to an R&D level in a binding
contract, cooperative R&D levels are chosen. When subjects do not or
cannot commit to a contract, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
performs well in predicting R&D decisions.
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11 Introduction
In the last decade an abundance of theoretical papers modelling competi-
tion and cooperation in R&D activities with technological spillovers have
arisen. Most of these are extensions or modiﬁcations of the seminal paper
of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)1 (henceforth AJ), in which ﬁrms in
duopoly decide on R&D in a ﬁrst stage and on production quantity in a
second stage. R&D in the models is to be interpreted as process R&D as
it reduces unit production cost. Spillovers are usually modelled in a way
that R&D eﬀorts of one ﬁrm result in a decline of unit production cost of
the other ﬁrm, without the latter bearing any cost. A general ﬁnding is
that R&D investment under joint proﬁt maximization (R&D cooperation) is
higher than under individual proﬁt maximization (R&D competition) if the
spillover is above a certain threshold, and lower otherwise. The results are
often interpreted as a rationale for government stimulation of the formation
of research joint ventures in industries with large knowledge spillovers.
An empirical investigation of the eﬀects of spillovers on R&D cooperation
of Belgian ﬁrms has been carried out by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002).
The authors distinguish between incoming ﬂows and outgoing ﬂows (appro-
priability) of knowledge or technological information and between diﬀerent
kinds of partners, of which about 10% are horizontally related competitors.
They ﬁnd that the probability of ﬁrms cooperating in R&D is higher when
incoming spillovers and appropriability are high and conclude that their re-
sults are in conﬂict with most of the AJ like theoretical models, which predict
that cooperative R&D incentives of ﬁrms increase with the level of (incoming
and outgoing) spillover. Since in AJ like models, partners are horizontally
related competitors and spillovers usually are symmetric2, it is quite hard
to compare these empirical ﬁndings with the theoretical ones. In fact, it is
hard in general to empirically test the models’ predictions. Spillovers, e.g.
are diﬃcult to measure empirically and can arise through diﬀerent channels,
such as e.g. the movement of R&D personnel, networks, meetings, patent ap-
plications and reverse engineering (see Veugelers, 1998). Therefore, I set up
an experiment in this paper to investigate whether in an R&D game cooper-
ative R&D outcomes are equally likely to be reached when spillovers are high
compared to when they are low. An important advantage of the experimental
approach is that the characteristics of spillovers and other assumptions made
1Kamien et al. (1992); Poyago-Theotoky (1995); Leahy and Neary (1997); Petit and
Tolwinski (1999); Hinloopen (2000)
2Examples of studies assuming asymmetries in e.g. costs or spillovers are Petit and
Tolwinski (1999) and Amir and Wooders (2000).
2in the models are completely under control. As such it is possible to identify
unambiguously the extent of R&D cooperation under diﬀerent spillover lev-
els. As to distinguish between behavior of subjects when R&D contracts are
allowed to be made and behavior in a noncooperative R&D game, I allow
for binding contract possibilities in half of the treatments. Results indicate
that in the noncooperative R&D game, R&D levels converge to the Nash
prediction, either with or without technological spillovers. Further, contract
possibilities in the contract treatments are not always used, but when they
are used, cooperative R&D levels are contracted. When contract are not
committed to, behavior is well predicated by Nash R&D equilibria. These
results apply for both spillover levels.
So far the use of experimental methods to examine hypotheses about R&D
behavior of ﬁrms is not so common. Examples of experiments on patent races
are Hey and Reynolds (1991) and Sbriglia and Hey (1994). Another series
of R&D experiments are found in Isaac and Reynolds (1986, 1988, 1992).
These papers build on a stochastic invention model of innovation, in which
the probability of producing a practically relevant innovation depends on
the amount of R&D investment of a ﬁrm. Appropriability is introduced by
inducing a distribution of payoﬀs among the sellers in the experimental mar-
kets. In the earliest experiments, this payoﬀ distribution was exogenously
determined by the experimenters, while in the most recent experiment it de-
pended on price and production decisions of the sellers. Main conclusions
are that ﬁrms over-invest in R&D relative to the social optimum in a Nash
equilibrium if private rewards from R&D equal social rewards and that a
reduction in appropriability for the innovator leads to reduced R&D spend-
ing by all participants. They also ﬁnd that risk-neutral noncooperative Nash
equilibrium predictors perform relatively well. Next to this, the experimental
results give support to behavior that is deﬁned as Schumpeterian competi-
tion, which is characterized by falling prices as a result of the cost-reducing
innovations and by non-creative ﬁrms being competed away. The theoretical
diﬀerence from a socially optimal viewpoint between monopoly and oligopoly
markets has also been found in their experiments. Market prices tend to fall
more slowly under monopoly than under oligopoly. A more recent example
of an experimental paper on R&D is Jullien and Ruﬃeux (2001). In their ex-
periments ﬁrms could either adopt an existing technology, that would reduce
production costs in a known way, or develop a new technology, with an un-
certain outcome. They also allow for spillovers but do not ﬁnd any inﬂuence
on R&D incentives. It is found that markets generally are eﬃcient but that
convergence of market prices towards their competitive level is slower in the
presence of endogenous shocks, when all oligopolists gain a cost reduction
3that shifts the aggregate supply curve downwards. Uncertainty would cause
heterogeneity in behavior.
As such, none of the previous experimental papers on R&D consider the
eﬀects of contract possibilities and the comparison between a noncoopera-
tive and a cooperative R&D game. They neither address the link between
spillovers and incentives to choose cooperative R&D levels. The paper is or-
ganized as follows. In section 2, the model on which the experiment is based,
is resumed. In section 3, the hypotheses to be tested and the experimen-
tal design are gathered from the model. A descriptive and an econometric
analysis of the experimental results are presented in section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 The AJ model
AJ assume that perfectly informed ﬁrms in a duopoly simultaneously decide
on R&D in a ﬁrst stage and are engaged in Cournot competition in a second
stage. In what follows, an industry with 2 symmetric ﬁrms is considered
which are of equal size, have equal cost functions and produce a homogeneous
good. The industry is characterized by a linear inverse demand function of
the following form:
P(Q) = a ¡ bQ (1)
with a;b > 0;
Q = Qi + Qj;
Qi = production quantity of ﬁrm i:
The unit cost function of ﬁrm i is assumed to be decreasing in its amount
of ‘eﬀective’ R&D, Xi, (Kamien et al., 1992) which is composed of its own
R&D, xi, and spilled over R&D of ﬁrm j, ¯xj. The spillover parameter is
between 0 and 1 and determines how much ﬁrm i can take advantage of the
other ﬁrm’s R&D expenditures without bearing any cost. Assuming a linear
function yields the following expression for the unit cost of ﬁrm i:
ci(Xi) = ® ¡ °Xi ° > 0;® < a: (2)
R&D investments are assumed to have decreasing returns, which is imple-





± > 0: (3)
The game is as usually solved using backward induction. As Cournot com-
petition is assumed, in the second stage ﬁrms individually maximize their
proﬁt with respect to their production quantity. Maximizing proﬁt of ﬁrm
i, ¼i = P(Q)Qi ¡ ci(Xi)Qi ¡ fi(xi), for i = 1;2 and replacing production










8i = 1;2; j 6= i: (4)
Suppose further that in the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms play a noncooperative R&D
game. If both ﬁrms choose to maximize their own proﬁt and expect the
same behavior from their competitor, the ﬁrst-stage maximization problem
is maxxi ¼e




2°(a ¡ ®)(2 ¡ ¯)
9b± ¡ 2°2(1 + ¯)(2 ¡ ¯)
8i = 1;2: (5)
If ﬁrms coordinate their R&D activities as to maximize the sum of their
proﬁts5 the symmetric maximization problem maxxi
P2
i=1 ¼e
i ;xi > 0, should




2°(a ¡ ®)(1 + ¯)
9b± ¡ 2°2(1 + ¯)2 8i = 1;2: (6)
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9b± ¡ 2°2(1 + ¯)2:
3In Amir (2000) a model with decreasing returns to own R&D — i.e. the AJ model —
is compared with one with decreasing returns to eﬀective R&D. In the latter case, instead
of deﬁning unit cost as a linear function of eﬀective R&D and R&D cost as a quadratic
function of R&D, unit costs are a square root function of R&D and R&D cost is the
decision variable.
4The second-order condition is 9b± > 2°2(2 ¡ ¯)2.
5In Kamien et al. (1992) this form of R&D cooperation is called cartelization.
6The second-order condition is 9b± > 2°2(5¯2 ¡ 8¯ + 5).
5¼¤¤ is larger than ¼¤ if the spillover is not equal to 0.5 (see also Kamien
et al., 1992; Hinloopen, 2000). It is clear that the strategic interactions in
the non-cooperative one-shot R&D game have some properties of a prisoners’
dilemma, such as e.g. Cournot games of output competition or Bertrand
games of price competition. Although ﬁrms have incentives to cooperate
in R&D, individual proﬁt maximization (i.e. R&D competition) is the best
response to any of the strategies of the competitor and thus represents the
Nash equilibrium. In the cooperative game, joint proﬁt maximization is
the prediction, given that ﬁrms can credibly commit to the (symmetric)
cooperative R&D level.
3 Experimental design and hypotheses
To focus on the R&D decisions made by the ﬁrms, in the experiment the
quantity decision is controlled by setting production quantity at its Nash-
Cournot equilibrium which is a function of ﬁrms’ R&D expenditures. This
is justiﬁed because European and American antitrust laws forbid ﬁrms to
collude in the output market. Besides, in this way I avoid testing optimization
in both stages (R&D and production) and backward induction. Thus, the
experiment concentrates on the R&D stage that is nested in the more general
two-stage game. The most widely separated levels of spillovers that are
possible are used, i.e. complete versus no R&D spillovers, to sharpen possible
contrasts in the results (Friedman and Sunder, 1994). The parameters of the
demand function, of the R&D cost function and of the unit cost function are
treated as constants. The chosen parameters are a = 250, b = 5, ® = 100,
° = 2 and ± = 57 and correspond to the following R&D equilibria, with x¤
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2:8 : ¯ = 0
6:2 : ¯ = 1:
The experiment consisted of three computerized experimental sessions8 with
40 participants in total, recruited from undergraduate economics courses and
7The parameter values satisfy requirements of stability as proposed by Henriques (1990)
and correspond to symmetric R&D solutions (see Salant and Shaﬀer, 1998).
8I used the software z-Tree, developed by Fischbacher (1999).
6randomly divided into ﬁxed groups of two (duopolies). The students were
not informed about the identity of their competitor. Each of the sessions
took less than 80 minutes. In the experiment subjects were told that they
participated in an experiment on decision-making in ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally,
the subjects were told that they were sellers in a market with two sellers of
a non speciﬁed product. They had common knowledge about the fact that
they were all subject to the same conditions related to demand and costs.
The subjects had to make (non-speciﬁed) investment decisions in the interval
of [0;25]9 during 27 periods, which decreased their unit production cost —
according to the linear unit cost function — and which induced a certain cost
— calculated on the basis of the quadratic R&D cost function. This decision
inﬂuenced proﬁt also via equilibrium production quantities. In the complete
spillovers case, subjects were told that their R&D decision also decreased
unit production cost of the other producer in his/her market, without the
latter bearing any cost. Subjects were able to simulate their production
quantity, selling price, unit production cost, total R&D cost and proﬁt on
the basis of their own decision and the other producer’s decision. Each
period took around two minutes, except the ﬁrst one which took longer to let
subjects become acquainted with the instructions and the computer program.
For participating and following the instructions carefully they received 100
Belgian francs (2.5 EUR). What they would earn on top of this was related to
the sum of the proﬁts they made in the experiments, which in turn depended
on their own and their competitors’ decisions. They were told that they
would earn on average 400 Belgian francs (around 10 EUR).
Since the players’ strategies stretch a continuum of possible strategies and
are thus not limited to either individual or joint proﬁt maximization, the
noncooperative R&D game is not really a prisoners’ dilemma, although the
same conclusion on the equilibrium outcome is reached. The Nash equilib-
rium is the expected theoretical outcome and ﬁnitely repeating the prisoners’
dilemma game does not change the Nash equilibrium. Thus, the ﬁrst hypoth-
esis would be the following.
Hypothesis 1 If no binding contracts can be made, ﬁrms compete in R&D,
irrespective of the level of technological spillovers.
For both spillover levels I allowed for the possibility of committing to a
contract in half of the duopolies. In these treatments subjects could propose
binding contracts to their competitor and could accept contracts proposed
9This interval was necessary to obtain no-nonsense results for variables such as unit
production cost.
7by their competitor. As in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) symmetry is
assumed with respect to the cooperative solutions, only symmetric contracts
were allowed. Once subjects had proposed a contract they were committed
to their proposal when the proposal was accepted. Thus there was no option
to deviate from an accepted contract. I expect that ﬁrms use contracts
and commit to the cooperative R&D level, as proﬁt that corresponds to the
cooperative level is higher than proﬁt that corresponds to the Nash level. As
such, the following is the second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 If binding contracts can be made, ﬁrms commit to a contract
and choose the cooperative R&D level, irrespective of the level of technological
spillovers.
As such, four treatments were run. That is ‘no contract’ and ‘contract’ for
both technological spillover levels of 0 and 1. An equal number of subjects
was appointed to each of the four treatments, i.e. 10. In what follows I often
refer to the treatments as Tkl, where k refers to the spillover level and l
to a dummy that is equal to 0 (1) for treatments without (with) contract
possibilities.
4 Experimental results
When analyzing the experimental results I am confronted with the possibil-
ity that duopolists are inﬂuenced by their competitor’s behavior in making
their R&D decisions, such that observations on R&D decisions are not inde-
pendent within the duopolies. Using the sum of R&D decisions by duopoly,
circumvents this problem and creates independent observations per duopoly.
Furthermore, assuming symmetry between competitors makes sense, since
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests yielded no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in average R&D
decisions between competitors within duopolies10. That is why in the analy-
ses the sum of R&D decisions by duopoly, referred to by capital X, is used.
If period 0 is ignored, for each subject I have a time series of 26 periods. As
the theoretical equilibria are symmetric, equilibria in each duopoly are twice
the individual equilibrium (see table 1 for the theoretical duopoly bench-
marks). In what follows a distinction is made between the descriptive and
statistical analysis and the econometric analysis. In a last subsection I focus
on contracting behavior of subjects.
10Averages over all periods, over the ﬁrst ten and the last ten periods have been com-
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4.1 Descriptive and statistical analysis
In ﬁgure 1 box plots of averages of the duopoly R&D decisions over all 26
periods are presented, as to get a ﬁrst idea of how the data look like. Data
of each of the four treatments are grouped. The boxes represent the inter
quartile range of the data and the whiskers represent the highest and lowest
values excluding outliers. The dotted line is the median. Outliers are deﬁned
as observations that deviate more than 3 box lengths from the upper and
lower edge of the box. One duopoly in the treatment with ¯ = 0 and without
chat or contract possibilities is identiﬁed as an outlier (marked with a star).
It is observed that in the no-spillover treatment without contract possibilities,
the median of the average duopoly R&D decisions is quite close to the Nash
equilibrium prediction. The average R&D decision of the outlying duopoly
is at the cooperative level though. In the complete spillover treatments the
median of R&D decisions in the treatment without contract possibilities lies
closer to the Nash prediction than to the cooperative R&D level, but not as
close as in the treatment without spillovers. In the contract treatments the
median R&D levels are somewhere between the Nash and the cooperative
level for both spillover levels. On the other hand, with spillovers, median
R&D is higher in the contract treatment than in the treatment without
contract possibilities and without spillovers median R&D is lower in the
contract treatment compared to the baseline treatment. From the previous
9section we know that without spillovers, the cooperative R&D level is lower
than the competitive level, while with spillovers, cooperative R&D is higher
than competitive R&D. Thus, the box plots point in the direction that either
with or without spillovers, subjects tend to cooperate more in the contract
treatments than in the baseline treatments.
The data in the box plots are based on averages taken over all periods. Since
subjects in the experiment had 26 periods to learn to play certain strategies,
R&D decisions could diﬀer between diﬀerent sub-periods. In table 1 averages
and standard deviations across duopolies of duopoly R&D decisions averaged
over all periods and two sub-periods are presented. The two sub-periods
are the ﬁrst ten and the last ten periods respectively. The two theoretical
benchmarks, i.e. the Nash and the cooperative R&D levels, are included in
the table with one and two stars respectively. The ﬁrst two rows in the
table represent averages of the treatments without contract possibilities (T00
and T10) and averages of the contract treatments (T01 and T11) respectively,
for both spillover levels. In the last two rows, I made a distinction within
the contract treatment between R&D decisions in periods in which contracts
were not committed to and contracted R&D decisions. T010 and T110 refer
to average R&D decisions in periods without contracts for ¯ = 0 and ¯ = 1,
while T011 and T111 refer to average contracted R&D decisions.
Average R&D decisions in the baseline treatments are clearly very close to
the Nash R&D levels for both spillover levels. With full spillovers, average
R&D in the ﬁrst periods lies between both theoretical benchmarks, while
in the ten last periods it is very close to the Nash equilibrium. Without
spillovers, also in the ﬁrst periods R&D decisions are close to the Nash level.
Within the contract treatments, observed average R&D decisions in periods
in which no contracts are signed, are very close to the Nash equilibria for
both spillover scenarios. This is the case for averages taken over all and the
last ten periods. In the ﬁrst ten periods, R&D decisions are much closer to
the cooperative level. For average contracted R&D decisions, observations
are the opposite, i.e. they evolve from close to the Nash level to close to
the cooperative level. This could indicate that subjects learned to contract
cooperative R&D levels and to play Nash in periods in which no contracts
were made.
As to investigate whether R&D decisions diﬀer in a statistically signiﬁcant
way between treatments and within the contract treatments, I performed
non-parametric tests. I compared average R&D decisions of the duopolies
in the last ten periods in the contract treatments with the decisions in the
treatments without contract possibilities. Only results of the last ten periods
are reported because when all periods are taken into account, no statistically
10X¤ X¤¤ ¯ X1¡26 ¯ X1¡10 ¯ X17¡26
¯ = 0
T00 11.5 5.5 10.7 (2.94) 11.1 (3.51) 10.5 (2.79)
T01 11.5 5.5 8.0 (1.72) 9.3 (1.67) 6.8 (0.74)
T010 11.5 5.5 12.3 (1.40) 6.8 (2.55) 13.7 (1.30)
T011 11.5 5.5 5.9 (0.15) 13.3 (4.06) 5.8 (0.10)
¯ = 1
T10 5.7 12.4 7.2 (1.95) 9.4 (2.84) 5.9 (2.59)
T11 5.7 12.4 9.5 (1.08) 8.8 (3.03) 9.9 (1.22)
T110 5.7 12.4 5.8 (1.60) 11.2 (1.79) 4.7 (1.42)
T111 5.7 12.4 12.3 (0.62) 6.1 (0.51) 12.3 (0.11)
Table 1: Average R&D decisions and standard deviations
Between Within
¯ = 0 ¯ = 1 ¯ = 0 ¯ = 1
z -1.567 -1.984 -1.826 -2.023
exact sig. (2-tailed) 0.151 0.056 0.126 0.062
exact sig. (1-tailed) 0.076 0.028 0.063 0.031
Table 2: Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon signed ranks test results
signiﬁcant diﬀerences are found. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that
subjects usually learn to play equilibrium or other strategies and that their
behavior only stabilizes and converges to a theoretical benchmark at the end
of the experiment. Table 1 contains indications that this kind of learning or
converging arises in our experiment. Indeed, average R&D decisions in the
ﬁnal ten periods are in general closer to one of the two theoretical benchmarks
than in the beginning of the experiment. Results of the tests are under
the header ‘Between’ in table 2. The null hypothesis is that R&D decisions
without contract possibilities do not diﬀer from R&D decisions with contract
possibilities. On the basis of one-tailed tests I would conclude that with
spillovers, R&D decisions are higher when contracts possibilities are available
compared to when they are not with a 5% signiﬁcance. Without spillovers,
the conclusion would be the opposite with a 10% signiﬁcance level, i.e. R&D
decisions are lower when contract possibilities are available compared to when
they are not available.
In another series of tests, of which results are reported in the same table
under the header ‘Within’, I compared R&D decisions in the contract treat-
ments averaged over periods in which contracts were not made with average
contracted R&D decisions. The tests I used, are Wilcoxon signed ranks tests.
Again, only observations in the last ten periods were used to compute aver-
11ages. Results are very similar to those of the Mann-Whitney tests. Thus, for
complete spillovers some evidence exists that R&D levels are higher if sub-
jects commit to an R&D contract (with 5% signiﬁcance). In the no-spillover
treatment it is found that if R&D contracts are used, subjects do less R&D
than if R&D is not contracted, with a signiﬁcance of 10%. So in general,
no diﬀerent conclusions regarding R&D behavior are made for the scenarios
with and without spillovers.
The above non-parametric tests are highly conservative and ignore important
information about the dynamic structure of the data (K¨ onigstein, 2000).
Indeed, for each duopoly a time series exists covering 26 periods of R&D
investment decisions (without period 0). When simply taking averages of
R&D decisions in some sub-period (in our case the last sub-period), the time
series structure of the data is completely ignored. That is why in what follows
I use econometric techniques to analyze the experimental data further.
4.2 Econometric analysis
To be able to compare the experimental R&D decisions with the theoreti-
cal competitive and cooperative equilibrium R&D decisions, it is necessary
to estimate an equilibrium value of the experimental R&D decisions. For
this purpose it is assumed that the R&D decision of each observation unit
(duopoly) and in each period is equal to the sum of a static long-term equi-
librium value, which is constant and thus not subject- nor time-speciﬁc, and
a subject- and time-speciﬁc random or residual ﬂuctuation. An economet-
ric model that satisﬁes this assumption is the following model (Mason and
Phillips, 1997):
Xk;l;t = µk + uk;l;t (7)
were the sum of R&D decisions of the lth duopoly equals Xk;l;t
11. The index
k represents the treatment, l the duopoly and t the time period. µk is to
be interpreted as the long-term equilibrium R&D investment in treatment k
and uk;l;t as the residual ﬂuctuations of pair l’s R&D investment in period
t around the long-term equilibrium in treatment k. Further it is expected
that a subject’s and as such a pair’s R&D decisions are correlated with R&D
decisions in previous periods, implying that the residuals in equation 7 follow




¸kjuk;l;t¡j + ²k;l;t (8)
11This capital X should not be confused with the expression Xi of section 3, which
represented eﬀective R&D of ﬁrm i.
12with ²k;l;t following a white noise process. The AR(j) series is stationary and
thus converges if the roots of the characteristic equation lie outside the unit
circle. For an AR(2) process this condition is reduced to j¸k1j < 1, j¸k2j < 1,
¸k1 + ¸k2 < 1 and ¸k2 ¡ ¸k1 < 1 (Greene, 2000). Equations 7 and 8 are
uniﬁed in the model
Xk;l;t = ¸k0 +
X
j=1
¸kjXk;l;t¡j + ²k;l;t; (9)
with the same convergence or stability conditions as in 8. An estimate for
the long-term equilibrium µk is computed from ¸k0 as follows: µk = ¸k0=(1¡
P
j=1 ¸kj).
For each of the four treatments I estimated a model as in (9) with the resid-
uals of equation (7) following an AR(2) process. The choice of 2 lags in the
autoregressive process is rather arbitrary, although with 2 lags one should
in general be able to correct for possible autocorrelation problems without
losing too many degrees of freedom. As in the non-parametric tests some
statistical evidence has been found for diﬀerences in R&D decisions within
the contract treatments in the sense that it mattered whether contract pos-
sibilities have actually been used by the subjects, a dummy is included in
the econometric equations. This dummy is equal to one in periods in which
a contract has been committed to, and equal to zero in periods in which no
contracts have been made. As to allow for diﬀerent slopes within the con-
tract treatments, interactions between the dummy and the right-hand-side
variables (i.e. the lagged R&D decisions) are also included. As it is assumed
that all parameters are the same across the cross-sectional observation units
(duopolies per treatment), it is likely that some cross-sectional correlation
exists. Moreover, based on the inspection of the variances of the diﬀerent
duopoly decisions within the treatments, cross-sectional heteroskedasticity is
also likely. Thus, feasible GLS is applied without imposing restrictions on
cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and correlation. In table 3 the econometric
results are given.
The superscripts 0 and 1 in the second part of the table refer to the pa-
rameter estimates not taking and taking into account the dummy respec-
tively. The sums of ˆ ¸0
ki and ˆ ¸1
ki for i = 0;1;2 are used to compute the con-
stant term and the slope when contract possibilities are actually used within
the contract treatments, while when no contract possibilities are used, the
constant term and the slopes are simply ˆ ¸0
ki for i = 0;1;2. Standard er-
rors were estimated heteroskedastic-consistently, as tests indicated possible
within-heteroskedasticity for some equations. The standard errors of the
static long-run equilibria have been calculated according to corollary 4.2.2.
13without contract possibilities with contract possibilities
T00 T10 T01 T11
ˆ ¸k0 3.64 [.000] 1.77 [.000] ˆ ¸0
k0 12.39 [.000] 3.51 [.000]
ˆ ¸k1 0.35 [.000] 0.47 [.000] ˆ ¸0
k1 0.06 [.169] 0.18 [.028]
ˆ ¸k2 0.28 [.000] 0.20 [.000] ˆ ¸0
k2 -0.06 [.108] 0.20 [.074]
ˆ ¸1
k0 -6.85 [.000] 6.63 [.000]
ˆ ¸1
k1 0.08 [.117] -0.12 [.010]
ˆ ¸1
k2 -0.04 [.302] -0.09 [.177]
ˆ µk 9.86 (0.39) 5.36 (0.40) ˆ µ0
k 12.41 (0.42) 5.62 (0.44)
ˆ µ1
k 5.78 (0.08) 12.15 (0.05)
GOF (a) 0.16 0.85 GOF (a) 0.93 0.94
Durbin-h(b) 1 2 Durbin-h(b) 1 1
N*T 5*24 5*24 N*T 5*24 5*24
P-values are in square brackets and standard errors in round brackets.
ˆ µk without outlier in T00 is 11.94 (0.25) and GOF is 0.39.
(a) Greene (2000).
(b) Number of duopolies with autocorrelation with ® = 0:05.
Table 3: Econometric results
in Fomby et al. (1984). For each equation a Durbin-h-statistic has been cal-
culated and the number of times the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation
has been rejected, is put under the row header ‘Durbin-h’. The autocor-
relation problems in some of the duopolies possibly are the consequence of
restricting the parameter to be the same across duopolies in each treatment.
From the table we learn that it is not always the case that the two lags of the
dependent variable signiﬁcantly diﬀer from zero. We do keep the two lags
though, as for ﬁnal estimates to be comparable.
It further seems that the dummies are highly signiﬁcant, which conﬁrms that
signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist within the contract treatments between R&D
levels in periods in which subjects have used the contract possibilities and
in periods that subjects have not used them. Removing the outlier in the
treatment ‘no spillover, no contract’ yielded estimates that are closer to Nash
predictions, which was to be expected since the average outlying duopoly’s
R&D decision is close to the cooperative level. The goodness-of-ﬁt is in
general higher in the contract treatments than in the other treatments. The
variance of the dependent variable in the contract treatments, i.e. duopoly
R&D decisions, is thus better explained by the model than in the no-contract
treatments. This could be partly due to the smaller variance (see also table
1) of R&D decisions when the possibility to make a contract is available.
14Further, the estimated static long-run R&D decisions (ˆ µk) are compared with
the theoretical predictions in table 1 using t-tests as to test the hypotheses
formulated in the previous section. Table 4 contains the results of these t-
tests. The superscripts 0 and 1 in the table again refer to estimates without
and estimates with the dummies that refer to whether a contract has actually
been committed to. From the t-tests it can be concluded that R&D behav-
ior of subjects with complete spillovers and no contract possibilities does
not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from competitive Nash behavior. In the no-spillovers
case, this conclusion can only be made when the outlier is ignored. In the
contract treatment without spillovers, estimated long-run R&D levels dif-
fer from the Nash prediction and the cooperative outcome in a statistically
signiﬁcant way. The diﬀerence between the estimated R&D level when no
contracts are signed and the Nash prediction is only signiﬁcant at a level of
5% though. These highly signiﬁcant diﬀerences result from the fact that the
variances of the estimates are very small. E.g. a statistical comparison be-
tween the estimated R&D level without spillovers for cases that contracts are
signed, which is 5.78 with a standard deviation of 0.08, and the cooperative
R&D level without technological spillovers, which is 5.5, yields a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence according to the t-test. Since in terms of proﬁt in experimental
units, this would not yield a notable diﬀerence, we have to be cautious and
to some extent conservative when interpreting the t-test results. The same
remark is valid for the contract treatment with spillovers. The estimated
R&D level based on cases in which a contract is chosen, is equal to 12.15
with a standard deviation of 0.05, while the cooperative R&D level is 12.4.
For periods in which no contract is signed, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence is found
between the R&D estimate and the Nash prediction. Bringing the most
and the least conservative analyses —the non-parametric tests and the t-test
based on the econometric estimates respectively—together, I would conclude
that irrespective of the spillover level, subjects choose the cooperative R&D
level in periods where they commit to a contract and choose the competitive
level otherwise.
To summarize, commitment to binding R&D contracts guarantees that R&D
levels are cooperative, either with or without spillovers. When committing
to an R&D contract is not possible, or simply not done, R&D behavior is
competitive, irrespective of the level of spillovers. Thus, so far, hypothesis 1
is not rejected and no diﬀerence in R&D behavior of subjects between both
spillover levels is found. As to gain more inside in the contracting behavior
of the subjects, I focus on data of the contract treatments in the following
subsection.
15spillover = 0 spillover = 1
T00 T01 T10 T11
H0: µ0
k = X¤ -4.16++ 2.19+ -0.96 -0.28
H0: µ0
k = X¤¤ 11.03++ 16.26++ -17.66++ -15.54++
H0: µ1
k = X¤ - -75.87++ - 122.08++
H0: µ1
k = X¤¤ - 3.31++ - -5.62++
Without the outlier, the t-values in T00 are respectively 1.87 and 26.10.
++H0 is rejected with ® = 0:01 (critical t value is 2.63).
+H0 is rejected with ® = 0:05 (critical t value is 1.98).
Table 4: Results of t-tests
4.3 Contracts
The aim of this subsection is to analyze further how contracting behavior
evolves during the experiment and how it diﬀers between the two techno-
logical spillover levels. In table 5 percentages are given for all duopolies, of
shares of periods in which contracts are proposed and committed to, in the
total number of periods. In the ﬁrst part of the table the percentages refer
to the shares of periods in which contract proposals are made by at least one
out of two subjects in a duopoly. In the second part of the table percentages
of shares of contracts actually committed to, are given. In the columns of
the table a distinction is made between the ﬁrst ten and the last ten periods,
as to investigate learning behavior of the subjects. The average shares across
all duopolies are in the last rows of both parts of the table.
It is observed that more contracts are in general committed to when no tech-
nological spillovers are present than with spillovers. But since this diﬀerence
is statistically not signiﬁcant12, I pay no further attention to it. For contract
proposals, no such diﬀerence neither exists. I further observe that for both
spillover levels more contracts are proposed and committed to in the last
periods of the experiment than in the ﬁrst periods. The diﬀerence between
the amount of contracts actually committed to in the ﬁrst ten periods and
the amount in the last ten periods is found to be statistically signiﬁcant with
a p-value of 0.00213. This provides evidence for learning behavior of sub-
jects. Subjects become acquainted with the contract possibility after some
time and thus learn to commit to contracts. This conclusion also coincides
with the observation that subjects learn to play theoretical strategies, which
12A Mann-Whitney test yields a p-value of 0.406 for the related two-tailed test for all
periods and 0.107 for the last ten periods.
13This results from a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test.
16duopoly ¯ = 0 ¯ = 1
all 1-10 17-26 all 1-10 17-26
Contract proposals
1 100% 100% 100% 85% 80% 80%
2 73% 30% 100% 81% 80% 80%
3 92% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100%
4 96% 90% 100% 89% 90% 100%
5 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
average % 92% 82% 100% 91% 90% 92%
Contracts actually committed to
1 89% 90% 100% 50% 40% 60%
2 39% 0% 80% 32% 10% 50%
3 54% 40% 80% 58% 40% 80%
4 89% 80% 90% 46% 30% 70%
5 69% 40% 90% 89% 80% 90%
average % 69% 40% 88% 55% 50% 70%
Table 5: Percentages of contracts
is supported by the data in table 1. More speciﬁcally, especially in the last
periods, contracted R&D decisions are close to the theoretical cooperative
R&D level, while R&D decisions in periods where no contracts are made, are
close to the (subgame perfect) Nash R&D level. With respect to contract
proposals, a similar test on the diﬀerence between the amount of contract
proposals at the beginning and at the end of the experiment gives none, or
at least much less signiﬁcance, i.e. a p-value of 0.125. Thus, it is unlikely
that the increase in contracts made, can only be explained by an increase in
the amount of contract proposals during the experiment.
It is found that during the experiment more and more contracts were made,
but this does not imply that ﬁnally, subjects always commit to a contract. In
the previous subsection, R&D behavior in periods in which no contracts are
committed to, has already been found to converge towards R&D competition.
Contracted R&D, on the other hand, converges towards the cooperative level.
It remains to be examined what the reasons are that in some periods sub-
jects did not commit to a contract. A ﬁrst reason could be that no contract
proposals were made in these periods. But, as table 5 shows, the percent-
ages of periods in which contracts have been proposed is high and deﬁnitely
higher than the percentage of periods with contracts for all duopolies and
all (sub)periods (except duopoly 1 in the last ten periods)14. This implies
that a signiﬁcant amount of contract proposals was not accepted in either
14This conclusion can also be made based on Wilcoxon signed ranks tests.
17duopoly ¯ = 0 ¯ = 1
not accepted accepted not accepted accepted
Periods 1-26
1 2.99 (0.76) 2.80 (0.40) 8.41 (6.20) 6.22 (0.26)
2 3.93 (3.31) 2.95 (0.05) 5.62 (1.47) 6.49 (1.48)
3 3.44 (0.89) 2.99 (0.29) 5.62 (1.39) 5.70 (1.18)
4 2.49 (1.75) 2.97 (0.66) 6.90 (4.11) 6.32 (0.54)
5 3.17 (0.65) 2.98 (0.06) 5.82 (0.46) 5.97 (0.31)
all 3.20 (2.72) 2.94 (0.75) 6.47 (1.47) 6.14 (0.29)
Periods 1-10
1 3.00 (0.00) 2.70 (0.65) 6.09 (2.13) 6.28 (0.51)
2 5.83 (5.97) - 4.79 (2.27) 10.00 (0.00)
3 3.86 (1.00) 3.23 (0.52) 5.08 (1.83) 4.58 (2.00)
4 2.26 (2.28) 3.25 (1.10) 6.59 (1.38) 6.73 (1.10)
5 3.29 (0.76) 3.00 (0.00) 5.67 (0.58) 5.75 (0.46)
all 3.65 (2.00) 3.04 (0.57) 5.64 (1.64) 6.67 (0.81)
Periods 17-26
1 3.30 (1.28) 2.88 (0.04) 8.79 (7.27) 6.22 (0.04)
2 2.95 (0.07) 2.94 (0.05) 6.16 (0.07) 6.49 (0.05)
3 2.90 (0.00) 2.90 (0.00) 6.07 (0.27) 5.70 (0.29)
4 2.90 (0.00) 2.83 (0.07) 8.94 (6.18) 6.32 (0.09)
5 2.90 (0.17) 2.96 (0.09) 6.10 (0.00) 5.97 (0.00)
all 2.99 (0.30) 2.90 (0.05) 7.21 (2.76) 6.13 (0.09)
Table 6: Average R&D contract proposals and standard deviations
the whole, the beginning or the end of the experiment. Further, it is un-
likely that contract proposals were used as a cooperative signal to mislead
the competitor, because once a proposal was done by a subject in a duopoly,
the counterpart could always accept the contract such that the proposer was
committed to it.
Another explanation could be that the contract proposals contained R&D
decisions which were diﬀerent from the cooperative level and thus not in-
teresting for subjects to commit to. In table 6 the averages and standard
deviations of proposed R&D decisions divided according to whether the con-
tract was accepted or not, are presented for all duopolies. Note that averages
of individual proposed R&D levels are taken and should thus be compared
with the cooperative R&D level of one ﬁrm in duopoly. For both spillover
levels we observe that proposed R&D decisions that are accepted in a con-
tract are closer to the cooperative R&D level (i.e. 2.9 for ¯ = 0 and 6.2 for
¯ = 1) than proposed R&D decisions that are not accepted when considering
all periods in the experiment. Also, standard deviations of R&D proposals
that were not accepted are larger than standard deviations of accepted R&D
18proposals. Thus, the fact that in some periods proposed R&D was too dif-
ferent from the cooperative R&D level, could have been a reason for subjects
not to commit to a contract. In the last ten periods, for most duopolies the
diﬀerence between average accepted and not accepted R&D proposals van-
ishes. For the ﬁrst ten periods, we observe that proposed R&D levels that
are either accepted or not, are in general not that close to the cooperative
R&D level compared to the general averages15. Based on these observations,
I would conclude that in general subjects learn to propose the cooperative
R&D level in a contract, and learn at the same time to commit to it. In the
beginning subjects make more mistakes when proposing and choosing ‘good’
R&D decisions.
Finally, remark that even contract proposals that contain the cooperative
R&D level, are sometimes not accepted, especially in the last periods of
the experiment. Probably, subjects occasionally try to deviate from the
cooperative R&D level contracted in previous periods in the expectation
that their counterparts keep choosing the cooperative R&D level, even when
no contract is made. But if strategies of all subjects are more or less similar,
it is eventually the Nash R&D level that arises in periods where no contracts
are made.
To summarize, contracts do not arise in all periods for all duopolies and
hypothesis 2 can thus be partly rejected. First, contract proposals do not
always contain an R&D level that is close enough to the cooperative level,
which is probably the reason why mainly at the beginning of the experiment
less contracts are made than at the end of the experiment. In the beginning,
subjects make more mistakes when proposing and choosing ‘good’ R&D de-
cisions. Learning to do ‘good’ R&D proposals goes together with learning
to commit to a contract. Secondly, even when contract proposals are ‘good’,
in the sense that they are close to the cooperative R&D level, they are not
always committed to. In those cases, subjects deviate in a sense from an
R&D level on which they agreed, i.e. the R&D level in contracts of previous
periods, and as such play a noncooperative strategy. The outcome for these
cases is the competitive R&D level.
15These observations are conﬁrmed in two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. The
null hypothesis is that no diﬀerence exists in the absolute value of the deviation of R&D
decisions from the cooperative level, between periods without and with accepted contract
proposals. When taking all periods in account, the p-value is 0.002, for averages of the
ﬁrst ten and last ten periods, the p-values are respectively 0.695 and 0.125.
195 Conclusion and remarks
In the paper I investigated in an experiment whether ﬁrms in duopoly com-
pete or cooperate in R&D for two levels of technological spillovers, assuming
Cournot competition in the output market. The experiment included a treat-
ment without contract possibilities and a treatment with binding contract
possibilities for each of the spillover levels (0 and 1). Three main ﬁndings
on R&D behavior in the lab are reported. First, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in R&D behavior between the scenario without technological spillovers and
the scenario with full spillovers are found. In this sense, behavior in the lab
coincides with the theoretical predictions.
Secondly, I ﬁnd that in the baseline treatments without contract possibil-
ities, R&D decisions that maximized individual proﬁt generally prevailed.
Thus, the (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium concept that is used in the
noncooperative model of AJ described R&D behavior in the ﬁnitely repeated
noncooperative game well.
The third ﬁnding is that in the contract treatments, observed R&D levels
were close to the cooperative R&D level, only if contracts were actually com-
mitted to. Contracts were not always committed to, though. Especially in
the beginning of the experiment less contracts were made, probably because
contract proposals contained R&D levels that deviated from the cooperative
level. This can partly be explained by the inexperience of the subjects in the
ﬁrst periods of the experiment. But also in the last periods, contracts were
not always committed to, although proposals were close to the cooperative
R&D level. Noncooperative Nash equilibrium play prevailed in those cases.
Policy conclusions that can be drawn from the ﬁndings in the experiment
are to a certain extent similar to the policy conclusions that are based on
the theoretical literature on cooperative and noncooperative R&D. Through
allowing cooperation in the R&D stage in industries with large technological
spillovers, higher levels of welfare can be reached. Allowing ﬁrms to commit
to a binding R&D agreement does not always guarantee that ﬁrms actually
commit to a contract, though, but it certainly helps to induce cooperative
R&D levels. On the other hand, it is also important for government to be able
to identify whether technological spillovers in industries are low or high, since
also in industries characterized by low spillovers, R&D contracts are mostly
committed to, if possible. It is clear that these policy conclusions hinge
among others on the assumption that ﬁrms compete in the output stage,
irrespective of whether the ﬁrms are engaged in an R&D cooperation project
with other ﬁrms or not. Whether the formation of research joint ventures
aﬀects ﬁrms’ decisions in the output stage, is left for further research.
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